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1. Introduction 
Managing scarcity to serve the public interest is a classic task of government. Whereas 
economic and political theory have paid much attention to the allocation of scarce goods 
and rights, until now a consistent and general legal theory of 'the allocating government' 
has been more or less absent. In fact, the law of public administration seems to assume 
that every party shall be granted a good or right once it satisfies all the necessary 
conditions.1 This assumption neglects the fact that in several areas of government 
regulation, individual rights such as authorisations and (financial) claims are available 
only in a limited quantity. As a result of this limited availability, certain applications for 
those rights must be denied even though the applicants satisfy all the necessary conditions. 
In other words, there may not be enough rights available to satisfy all qualified parties. 
This idiosyncratic feature of limited rights can be illustrated using a number of 
examples. First, it is worth mentioning the auctions of the 4G spectrum in several 
Member States as an example of rights which are scarce for natural reasons. With 
revenues running up to billions of euros, the financial importance of these frequencies 
for both the allocating authorities and the bidding undertakings is clear from the outset. 
In the area of gambling law, an area entirely different from telecommunications law at 
first sight, scarcity exists as well: in order to ensure the protection of consumers and to 
combat crime and gambling addiction, many Member States artificially restrict the 
number of authorisations that are available to be granted. The same holds true for 
financial grants, although the background is different: in order to restrict expenditure, 
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most kinds of financial grants and subsidies are available in limited budget only, both at 
the European level and at the level of the Member States. Last but not least, we mention 
the many procurement procedures being performed in order to conclude supply contracts 
with market parties. 
This book seeks to demonstrate the need for a consistent and general theory on the 
allocation of limited rights by administrative authorities from a legal perspective. Since 
all these limited rights are usually of great importance to applicants - they represent 
significant economic value, and it is often not possible for the applicant to perform the 
intended activities without the requested permit, authorisation or subsidy - decisions 
concerning the allocation of limited public rights often lead to disputes, for example on 
the lack of transparency, the selected allocation procedure or the renewal of limited 
rights to the detriment of new entrants in the market. 
Since many limited rights have a European origin or a cross-border impact, the 
allocation of these rights is subject to a process of Europeanisation and consequent 
economisation of administrative law.2 Although European Union law has always been 
aimed at establishing and ensuring the functioning of an internal market (an area 
without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital is ensured)3 over the years the corpus of EU law has extended in volume and 
detail. Not surprisingly, this offers new possibilities for undertakings and other applicants 
to contest the allocation of limited rights, even in cases falling outside the (direct) scope 
of EU law. Arguments derived from European law, be it primary EU law or (specific) 
secondary legislation, can sometimes be invoked successfully before the national courts 
in cases where national law offers less protection of the interests of competing applicants, 
or none at all. By doing so EU law concepts are introduced in disputes in policy fields that 
have been governed traditionally by national law only. 
Furthermore- and more importantly- many of the above-mentioned legal issues are 
not exclusively linked to a particular policy field, but - on the contrary - seem to be 
characteristic of any allocation oflimited rights by administrative authorities. Therefore, 
solutions to these legal problems may be available not only in the area at stake, but also 
in other areas that are confronted with limited rights. This calls for a general legal theory 
of the allocation of limited public rights. This view is supported by the fact that both 
national courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter: CJEU) are 
increasingly willing - in the absence of specific legislation - to consider the allocation of 
limited rights in various fields oflaw under general legal principles, like the fundamental 
freedoms or the principle of equal treatment. To illustrate this point,4 reference can be 
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made to judgments by the CJEU in the field of public procurement,5 gambling,6 
telecommunications? petrol stations,8 pharmacies9 and opticians10, as well as judgments 
by national courts in different Member States on issues like limited licences for 'Sunday 
night stores', 11 gambling, 12 and C02 emission allowances.l3 
The search for a general legal theory oflimited rights fits in broader thinking throughout 
the EU and its Member States concerning the development and codification of general 
principles of law governing composite administration at the European and national 
level. Using these general principles, gaps can be filled in specific legislation or when 
legislation is lacking altogether. General principles can also serve as landmarks when 
developing new legislation. As such, they could even have a harmonising effect. Legal 
practice will also be aided by a general legal theory since the wheel does not have to be 
re-invented everywhere, thereby contributing to legal certainty and efficiency. Not only 
legislatures, administrative bodies and judges, but also the various applicants for limited 
rights and their competitors will therefore benefit from a general legal theory of this 
phenomenon. This makes the attempt to arrive at such an overall theory all the more 
challenging. 
In order to support and expand a generalised analysis of the allocation of limited rights 
from a legal perspective, the following question will be the focus of this introductory 
chapter and further in the other contributions in this book: 
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This introductory chapter is structured as follows. After demonstrating the need for a 
consistent and general legal perspective to the allocation of limited rights by 
administrative authorities in add ition to economic and political theory (Section 2), we 
elaborate on the legal approaches that can be adopted in order to disentangle the 
phenomenon of limited rights (Section 3). We then go on to identify three approaches 
that are useful in this regard: a conceptual app1·oach, a top-down approach and a 
bottom-up approach. The conceptual approach aims to distinguish the general elements 
characterising any allocation of limited rights (Section 4). The top-down approach 
addresses the relevance of EU law for (general) rules and principles on the allocation of 
limited rights (Section 5). Finally, the bottom-up approach takes a reverse perspective by 
focusing on the ways Member States use the freedom left by EU law to regulate the 
allocation of limited rights in several areas of government intervention (Section 6). In 
these three sections, we outline the relevance of the various chapters in this book as 
'building blocks' for a general legal theory on the allocation of limited rights in the EU 
and its Member States. In the concluding remarks (Section 7), we reflect briefly on this 
theory and the next steps to be taken. 
2. Economic, Political and Legal Issues 
The allocation of limited rights by administrative authorities can be analysed using 
several academic disciplines.14 When focusing on the aspects of' allocation' and 'scarcity', 
the allocation oflimited rights falls firstly within the scope of economics. In his seminal 
Essay on the Nature & Significance of Economic Science, Robbins defined economics as 
the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce 
means which have alternative uses.15 This definition perfectly fits our subject matter: 
since only a limited number of rights is available to be granted, the number of applicants 
may exceed this number of rights as a result of which these rights have alternative 
recipients. Several branches of economic theory deal explicitly with the allocation of 
scarce resources, like resource allocation theory and auction theory.16 However, since 
economic theory used to claim to be neutral with regard to the ends of allocation,l7 the 
question concerning which allocation principles should guide the allocation remains, at 
least partly, an open question in economics. 
This question has been debated in philosophical and political theories on distributive 
justice, addressing the issue of which allocation principles, like efficiency, merit or need, 
should be decisive in the allocation of scarce resources.18 These philosophical theories, 
like the approach in economic theory, usually abstract from the specific (legal) context 
14 
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for a particular allocation of scarce resources and therefore do not take into account 
existing legal constraints on the design of allocation mechanisms. 
In contrast to economics and distributive justice theory, such a pre-eminent role for 
scarcity and allocation issues seems to be lacking in law, at least in administrative law. To 
put it somewhat simplisticaJiy, as mentioned in the introduction, the 'default' legal 
approach to granting rights is that public authorities should grant a right whenever an 
applicant meets the conditions necessary to be granted that right. This does not mean 
that legal doctrine is totally unaware of the phenomenon of limited rights. In particular 
- and not surprisingly - there is a huge branch oflaw & economics literature with regard 
to public regulation, including monopoly regulation and public franchising. It is worth 
emphasising that Coase's founding articles on law & economics, 'The Federal 
Communications Commission' (1959) and 'The Problem of Social Cost' (1960),19 
addressed in particular the use of pricing mechanisms by administrative authorities for 
the allocation of scarce resources (broadcasting frequencies and pollution rights). 20 In 
recent literature on law and economics, this explicit attention to market mechanisms on 
the allocating of scarce resources is still clearly present.21 However, because of the 
instrumental approach in literature on law and economics and the strong emphasis on 
law as a tool for public regulation,22 there is hardly any attention for the more doctrinal 
issue ofhow the allocation of these limited rights should be incorporated into a consistent 
and general legal framework. Shifting our perspective from an instrumental function of 
law to a more protective one,23 focusing on the protection of individual citizens' interests 
and - conversely - the need for proper or sound administration, the literature remains 
even more silent, at least with respect to fundamental legal principles that should guide 
the allocation of limited rights and thereby give due care to the interests of market 
parties. 
This chapter therefore aims to address relevant legal questions in order to establish 
general allocation rules and principles and to identify best legal practices applying to any 
allocation of limited rights. The resulting legal framework should be fitted into the 
classic, 'non-limited' part of administrative law in order to create a coherent and 
consistent system oflegal protection, applying to any granting of rights by administrative 
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authorities. At the same time, this framework functions in addition to literature on law 
and economics, and economic and philosophical insights on the allocation of limited 
rights, and thereby contributes to a profound and multidisciplinary analysis of the 
phenomenon of limited rights. 
3. Legal Approaches 
Above all, it is necessary to introduce general terminology that will facilitate a generalised 
analysis of the allocation of limited rights by administrative authorities. This 'conceptual' 
approach24 precedes any other legal approach to limited rights that aims to develop a 
consistent and general legal theory on this matter. The conceptual approach takes 
account of the specific characteristics of, on the one hand, the ~resources' that are to be 
allocated, i.e. rights awarded by administrative authorities, and, on the other hand, the 
allocation procedures facilitating a relative comparison of applicants. Thus, this 
conceptual approach should be followed in close connection with similar definitions in 
economic theory and theories of distributive justice. The resulting conceptual framework 
might facilitate any legal system, either at the EU level or at the national level, to adopt 
general rules and principles on the allocation of limited rights. 
Next, considering the relationship between the EU level and the level of the Member 
States in more detail, two opposite approaches can be distinguished: a top-down 
approach and a bottom-up approach. In the top-down approach, we examine the 
influence of EU law on the design of allocation systems, both at an EU level and at a 
national level. Therefore, the relevant question becomes: Which elements of a general 
legal theory on the allocation oflimited public rights follow from European Union law?25 
This approach highlights the guiding role of the European institutions, including 
the Court of Justice, in the development of requirements applying to the allocation of 
limited rights. This guidance may vary in its general or specific character, depending 
on the question whether it applies to a particular area of policy regulation (e.g. 
telecommunications law, gambling law) or has a more general scope (e.g. services). Thus, 
it should be emphasised that this top down approach is not restricted to a deductive 
exercise starting with the general principles of EU law, but may also cover more specific 
allocation rules resulting from EU law.26 
In the absence of exhaustive and crystallised top-down regulation with regard to 
the allocation of limited rights, there is a need for a bottom-up approach as well. This 
bottom-up approach aims to identify common principles or rules to the allocation of 
limited rights that apply in the absence of or in addition to EU regulations. This 
inductive approach, which is complementary to the top-down approach, requires a 
comparative view on the subject matter and aims at identifying some ius commune or 
24 
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best legal practicesP We find it helpful to distinguish two dimensions within this 
bottom-up approach. In the first place, it is useful to analyze several areas of public 
regulation with limited rights (e.g. telecommunications law, gambling law and subsidy 
law) with the intention of identifying similarities and differences across these areas that 
may contribute to common rules or principles. In the second place, within these 
part icular areas of public regulation, it is useful to compare Member States' practices 
with each other concerning their use of discretion as left by EU law. This bottom-up 
approach therefore serves to identify a common, though minimal, legal core of 
allocation rules, while respecting Member States' discretion in the allocation oflimited 
rights. 
In the following sections, the implications of these three approaches are sketched 
briefly by highlighting some general developments and pointing out some important 
findings in the other chapters to this book. In fact, these three sections show that these 
approaches should go hand-in-hand. Therefore, the three parts of the book follow the 
three distinctive approaches identified above, but only to a certain extent. 
4. Conceptual Approach: Definitions and Characteristics 
Right from the outset, it is necessary to introduce some uniform terminology on the 
subject matter in order to have a clear understanding of limited rights. To explain this 
phenomenon accurately, it is useful to make a conceptual distinction between (i) the 
object of allocation (the 'what' question), (ii) the method of allocation (the 'how' question) 
and (iii) the legal form of the allocation (the 'form' question). The advantage of these 
conceptual distinctions is that they generate general tools to explain the essential features 
of the allocation of limited public rights. Moreover, these distinctions could prevent us 
from some rather complicated misunderstandings. 
4.1. Object of Allocation: Limited Rights 
Let us first address the object of allocation. In other words: how do we conceptualise the 
notion of limited rights? An answer to this question also offers a first glimpse of the 
scope of this book. With the term 'rights' we designate individual rights granted by an 
administrative authority. These 'public' rights can be subdivided into two main categories: 
'authorisations' and 'claims'.28 
An 'authorisation' covers any administrative decision creating an individual 
exception to a statutory prohibition or injunction. It concerns various types of government 
approvals that exist in legal practice, such as licences or permits. As an overarching 
characteristic, all these approvals imply a permission from an administrative authority 
to engage in a certain (usually economic) activity which is otherwise prohibited. 
Z7 
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Claims result from administrative decisions awarding rights to a positive act of an 
administrative authority.29 The main types of claims are financial grants (subsidies) on 
the one hand and governmental commissions on the other. Financial grants or subsidies 
of an administrative authority do not merely concern government approval but rather 
governmental incentives or support. Governmental commissions, by contrast, create a 
claim for a private party against the commissioning government to something in return 
for the supply of goods and services. Usually this reciprocity or consideration consists of 
payment, but this reciprocity may also consist of the right to exploit these goods or 
services. 
The next issue is what we mean by limited. Stripped of most of the complexities, (public) 
rights are limited if they are available in a limited quantity. Therefore, limited rights 
presuppose a maximum - often referred to as a ceiling- indicating the maximum number 
of rights that can be granted (within a given period). There may be numerous reasons for 
administrative authorities to set such a ceiling: it may result from scarcity of natural 
resources, like the radio spectrum or mineral resources, but can also be inspired by 
legitimate 'artificial' reasons, like consumer protection or public order. Of course, it 
should also not be neglected that allocating authorities might pursue their own interests 
as 'necessary side-effects', like collecting extra revenues. 
At this point, it should be stressed that the governmental task of managing scarcity is 
not restricted to the allocation of limited rights. For example, the government can assign 
alternative modes of use to several parts of a certain scarce resource (e.g. radio spectrum) 
in order to balance the various interests involved in the use of this resource without 
introducing a (limited) authorisation scheme. 
Several characteristics of limited rights are relevant for the allocation of these rights. The 
first aspect to be highlighted is the duration of rights. Exactly because a ceiling allows 
only a limited number of parties to conduct certain activities, the disadvantages of the 
rejection of applications and the prevention of parties entering the market would be 
'eternal' if these limited rights were granted for an indefinite period. 
Next, it is important whether these limited rights are tradable or not.30 If rights can 
be transferred, 31 applicants missing out in the allocation procedure are not banned 
forever from obtaining this limited right. This transferability of rights is especially 
appealing when these rights represent a significant financial value, which is often the 
case with rights that are available in a limited number only. 
In sum, the object of allocation raises a number of issues that are relevant for the 
allocation of limited rights, inter alia (i) when may or should the number of public rights 
be limited, (ii) how are these limitations constructed legally and (iii) does it make any 
29 
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legal difference, which subject (e.g. radio frequencies, C02 em1sswns or gambling 
activities) these limited rights concern? Answering these kinds of questions with regard 
to the object of allocation might be a first step in the development of a consistent and 
general legal theory on the allocation of I imited rights. 
4.2. Allocation Procedures 
Scarcity is a relative notion that binds supply and demand. Thus, whenever the total 
number of applicants exceeds the number of available rights, these limited rights are 
called scarce. In those circumstances of scarcity, limited rights have to be granted by 
means of a so-called allocation procedure. Following this terminology, an allocation is 
understood as the resulting award of limited rights to individual applicants, thereby 
excluding other applicants from obtaining these rights.32 
There are several allocation methods or procedures of allocation that can be applied by 
an administrative authority. The allocation procedures commonly used are:33 
- the order of receipt of the applications ('first come first served'); 
- the drawing of lots.; 
- an auction; 
- a comparative assessment (also called 'beauty contest' or 'tender'); 
- a proportional division. 
This list of allocation procedures is not meant to be exhaustive. For example, it is 
sometimes useful to distinguish public procurement as a separate allocation procedure, 
because it is the most regulated and detailed procedure to allocate limited rights. 34 
Nonetheless, as indicated by Jansen in this book, public procurement may be classified 
either as an auction or as a comparative assessment dependent on the applicable 'award 
criteria'. 
Anyway, characteristic of any of these allocation procedures is that these procedures 
have a relative character: applications are compared by means of one or more allocation 
criteria. For example, in the case of allocation in order of receipt of applications it is 
decisive which application was received first by the awarding authority. However, in the 
case of an auction, the applicant with the highest financial bid determines the outcome. 
Consequently, each allocation procedure has its own characteristics. 
1 ~ t~is re.spect, there is no uniform terminology. Instead, a wide variety of terms and definitions can be 
t~stmguts~ed. In the area of radio spectrum policy, e.g., frequency distribution to several services 
d.· ro~dca~ttng, mobile communications, etcetera) is called 'allocation', where the subsequent frequency 
S lSt~lbution to individual undertakings is called 'assignment' (Article IITU Radio Regulations 2012). 
ee mto more detail the chapter by Oberst in this book. 
Elster 1992, p. 67 If. 
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When considering the allocation of limited rights, attention should not be restricted to 
the so-called 'initial' allocation. For example, if the initial allocation has been accompanied 
by a waiting list, limited rights that have been withdrawn afterwards, will be granted to 
the initially unsucce~sful applicants. Moreover, an important issue is whether rights that 
have been granted can be modified, extended or renewed without applying a new 
allocation procedure. In particular, in relationship to the duration of limited rights 
mentioned above, the issue of prolongation turns out to be highly relevant: as a result of 
prolongation, newcomers who will reckon with the limited duration of limited rights, 
might (once again) not be able to compete for these rights in the future. Finally, after the 
expiry of limited rights, these rights become available again to grant, provoking the 
debate whether new entrants should be put at an advantage vis-a-vis incumbents. 
Thus, in addition to the issues raised by the object of allocation, a generalised analysis of 
the allocation procedure provokes a number of additional questions, e.g. (i) when should 
limited rights be allocated by a competitive method, (ii) what kind of objective allocation 
criteria are used in order to prevent favouritism and nepotism, and (iii) how can the 
equal treatment oflong-established parties and newcomers be ensured? Whereas general 
or uniform answers to these questions should not always be expected, differences 
between allocation procedures should still be justified by some consistent legal theory on 
the allocation of limited rights. 
4.3. Legal Form 
Apart from the object and the procedure, the legal form of the allocation should be 
distinguished. The legal form of an allocation refers to the public or private form in 
which the limited right at stake is granted. Generally, administrative authorities grant 
public rights by unilateral single case decision-making or by a contract. Although a 
public right will usually be allocated unilaterally, it is sometimes necessary that the other 
(receiving) party agrees with this grant and that there is some kind of bilateral or 
multilateral legal form to express this reciprocity. In particular, this kind of agreement 
- a bilateral or multilateral "public" contract - is need·~d when the administrative 
authority lacks the power to grant the public right unilaterally. "Public" contracts in this 
broad sense, i.e. contracts of which at least one of the parties is a public authority, 35 are 
conceptualised very differently in several EU Member States: in some jurisdictions, these 
public contracts are understood to be administrative agreements under public law while 
in other jurisdictions as civil law contracts. 36 
35 
36 
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Although this is not necessarily the same in every legal system, a certain kind of 
limited right does not automatically imply a certain allocation procedure, nor does a 
certain kind of allocation procedure imply a certain legal form. For example, a licence is 
more than once issued on a first come first served basis, but can be subject to an auction 
as well. Licences are often issued unilaterally, but sometimes it is necessary that the 
licence is accepted by the other party to have legal force. Similarly, the allocation 
procedure of a comparative assessment ('beauty contest') can result in both a unilateral 
decision and a (public) contract. Nor can we equate every governmental commission 
with a public contract, because not every governmental commission has a bilateral 
nature. The same holds for the public procurement procedure: most often, this allocation 
results in a bilateral public contract, but this is not necessarily the case; the public 
procurement procedure may also be used in the case of unilateral decision-making. 37 
1herefore, in addition to the questions raised by the object of allocation and by the 
allocation procedure, it is necessary to address issues relating to the legal form of the 
allocation, e.g. (i) does EU law prescribe a preferred legal form oflimited rights, (ii) which 
judge (civil, administrative or otherwise) has jurisdiction with regard to the various legal 
forms of limited rights, and (iii) to what extent do the various legal forms of limited 
rights entail specific problems of legal protection? These issues on the legal form of the 
allocation already mark the need for a comparison between EU Member States (below 
Section 6), as different legal systems might result in different answers. 
4.4. Reflection 
Part I of this book shows first of all the merits of a conceptual approach. In this respect, 
as Arroyo and Utrilla make clear in their chapter, the use of clear 'allocation' terminology 
is necessary to unveil the typical characteristics of an allocation of limited rights. 
Moreover, uniform terminology should be preferred as much as possible, although 
differences in terminology might be justified. This allocation terminology facilitates the 
analysis of the importance of general principles of law for the identification of specific 
allocation rules. Arroyo and Utrilla illustrate this with their constitutional approach to 
limited rights, characterised by the deduction of normative findings from a set of higher 
principles which operate as structural building blocks of a legal system for the allocation 
of limited rights. 
37 See explicitly Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
23 October 2007 on public passenger transport services by rail and by road and repealing Council 
Regulations (EEC) Nos 1191/69 and 1107/70 [2007] OJ L 315/1: whereas the competent authorities are 
required to award public service contracts on the basis of a competitive tenderingprocedure (Article 5(3)), 
these public service contracts are defined as 'one or more legally binding acts confirming the agreement 
between a competent authority and a public service operator to entrust to that public service operator 
the. m~nag;ment and operation of public passenger transport services subject to public service o~hgatJOns · Depending on the law of the Member State, this contract may also consist of 'a decision 
~~~ted br the competent authority taking tile form of an individual legislative or regulatory act' 
llcle 2(!)) (emphasis added by the authors). 
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In legal practice, however, there is still much work to be done. Buijze notes that the 
EU legislature does not contribute to the allocation of limited rights with a detailed set 
of general allocation rules. The EU legislature has more than one reason to be interested 
in the allocation of limited rights, i.e. the proper functioning of the internal market and 
the potential of limited rights as an instrument to give effect to EU policy within the 
environmental or the social domain for example. As a result, EU law does respect the fact 
that the allocation of limited rights can also serve other (general) objectives than 
efficiency and competition within the internal market. However, the question how these 
objectives are being pursued, is primarily a matter of the Member States; EU law provides 
only guidance with some 'broad principles', for example on subsidiarity and 
proportionality. While it is far from easy to determine what these broad principles 
require in practice, more detailed rules at the EU level are not the solution according to 
Buijze. Instead, the national legislature should address this issue. 
As to this role of the national legislature, Van Ommeren points out that in order to be 
fruitful, any such legislative attempt should balance between principle-based regulation 
and rule-based regulation. While several principles have shown to be very powerful in 
the regulation of the allocation oflimited rights, rule-based legislation remains necessary. 
In particular, this rule-based regulation should take into account key features of the 
allocation of limited rights, such as the power to set a ceiling, the choice between 
allocation procedures and the (limited) duration and transferability of limited rights. 
Moreover, the national legislature should make explicit its allocation objective, thereby 
completing the wide range of discretion left to it by the EU legislature. 
The idiosyncratic features of limited rights also come to the fore with regard to 
questions of judicial protection. First of all, disappointment is inherent to any allocation 
of limited public rights: the award of one application implies the rejection of another. 
Consequently, allocation decisions have a dispute-triggering character: parties are not 
inclined to consider an allocation procedure as being fair, when they did not receive what 
they applied for because the available rights were issued to another party. Another 
relevant characteristic for many allocation procedures is the phenomenon of 'phased 
decision making'. As a result, there are usually several moments for interested parties to 
seek legal protection. It should not be surprising that if the allocation procedure takes 
longer, it becomes more difficult for a judge to intervene. In this regard, Wollenschliiger 
states that allocation procedures do not follow the classic bipolar citizen-state paradigm 
on which many rules and institutions of administrative law are based. The multipolar 
paradigm that is necessary instead to capture the allocation of limited rights, poses a 
challenge to legal doctrine and jurisprudence. For example, the need for so-called 
'stability' of allocation decisions, ruling out their ex-post repeal once allocation 
procedures have been executed, results in the substitution of ex-post remedies by 
preventive or prospective remedies, on the one hand, and in the complete exclusion of 
primary legal remedies (annulments of allocation decisions) with a limitation to 
secondary legal remedies (damages) on the other hand. 
In sum, the conceptual approach sketched above provides for the tools necessary to 
unveil the peculiar characteristics of the allocation of limited rights within the domain 
of (administrative) law. The resulting legal concepts can be used in both a top-down 
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approach and a bottom-up approach, as these concepts abstract from the particular 
allocation context. 
5. Top-Down Approach: EU Law Perspectives 
5.1. Introductory Observations 
Many of the current legal issues on the allocation oflimited rights have been influenced, 
in one way or another, by developments in EU law. In order to elaborate on this point, it 
is useful to distinguish several levels of EU regulation. While some allocation rules apply 
to EU institutions only, EU law may also prescribe specific rules for the allocation of 
limited rights by Member States. Between those two extremes, several kinds of 
intermediate forms of influence of EU rules and principles can be traced with regard to 
allocation issues in the Member States or, in a wider perspective, in the European 
composite administration. 38 Below, we will outline some important developments in EU 
law that we regard as being most relevant to a generalised approach to allocations of 
limited rights, both at EU level and at national level. 
5.2. Allocation at EU Level 
Several limited rights are granted by EU institutions. Examples include the granting of 
subsidies and the award of public contracts by the European Commission, but also 
limited authorisations that have been awarded occasionally at an EU level. 39 Currently, 
the most relevant provisions on these so-called 'EU limited rights' are laid down in the 
Financial Regulation40 and the corresponding Delegated Regulation of the Commission. 41 
The chapter by Van den Brink describes accurately how the allocation of EU subsidies 
has evolved during the most recent 'programme periods' of the EU. In particular, the 
current Financial Regulation and the corresponding Delegated Regulation contain 
rather specific provisions on allocation criteria, in particular prescribing the tender 
procedure as the allocation procedure to be applied. The impact of EU law on the 
allocation of limited subsidies can be characterised as a manifestation of a sliding scale: 
38 
39 
40 
See on composite administration O.J.D.M.L. Jansen and B. Schiindorf-Haubold (eds.), The European 
Composite Administration, Intersentia, Antwerp 2011; A. Von Bogdandy and Ph. Dann, 'International 
Composite Administration: Conceptualizing Multi-Level and Network Aspects in the Exercise of 
International Public Authority' (2008) German Law journal, 2013; H.C.H. Hofmann and A.H. Tiirk 
(eds.), Legal Challenges in EU Administrative Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2009. 
See for the award of frequencies for mobile satellite services at an EU-wide level the chapter by Oberst 
in this book. 
Regulation {EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of25 October 
2012 
on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council ~egula~io~ (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 (2012) OJ L 298/1 {hereinafter Financial Regulation). 
;mmtsston Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1268/2.012 of29 October 2012 on the rules of application :n Reg.ulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
R anlcta.l rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (2012) OJ L 362/1 (hereinafter Delegated egu atton). 
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whereas until recently, the rules of the Financial Regulation covered' direct administration' 
by EU institutions only, the current rules include 'shared management' by national 
authorities as wel1,42 although it is still unclear what this extension means exactly for 
national authorities when allocating (European) subsidies. Although there is still a 
difference in regulatory intensity as to the granting of subsidies vis-a-vis the award of 
public contracts,43 both the granting of subsidies and the award of public contracts are 
governed by some general budgetary principles, e.g. the principle of sound financial 
management (including the principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness44) and 
the principle of transparency, which may shed particular light on the allocation of these 
categories of limited rights.45 
Outside the scope of the Financial Regulation, European administrative law is 
constantly changing as well. Relevant in this respect is the European Parliament 
resolution concerning a Law of Administrative Procedure of the European Union. 46 This 
resolution requests the Commission to submit a proposal for a regulation on a European 
Law of Administrative Procedure, which should apply to the Union's institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies ('the Union's administration') in their relations with the public.47 
According to this resolution, the intended regulation should at least include the principle 
of equal treatment and non-discrimination and the principle of transparency. However, 
the regulation may even include more detailed general provisions on the allocation of 
limited rights, as the ReNEUAL Model Rules on EU Administrative Procedure show.48 
It follows from the developments described above that spillover effects to allocations 
of limited rights by administrative authorities in Member States should not be excluded. 
As for the Financial Regulation, one can assume that these rules influence national 
subsidy practice as well, given the fact that national authorities executing national 
subsidy schemes are often selected to implement European subsidy schemes as well, 
while (partly) using the same procedural rules for both tasks. Therefore, these rules, 
though directed towards the EU institutions may serve as a starting point for the design 
of allocation procedures by Member States in order to comply with fundamental 
principles of equal treatment and transparency. Likewise, the European Parliament has 
emphasised that a European Law of Administrative Procedure could strengthen a 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
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Article 59(1) Financial Regulation. 
The rules on procurement are laid down in title V of the Financial Regulation, the rules on grants are 
to be found in Title VI. 
Article 30 Financial Regulation. 
With regard to budgetary matters, this obligation of transparency is essentially intended to preclude 
any risk of favouritism or arbitrariness on the part of the budgetary authority. Cf. Article 31 Financial 
Regulation. According to the General Court, this principle of transparency, because of its fundamental 
nature, applied to the procedure for awarding grants from the Community budget even although the 
applicable Financial Regulation of 21 December 1977 did not mention this principle expressly (Case 
T-297/05, IPK International [2011] ECR II-1859, para. 123). 
European Parliament resolution concerning a Law of Administrative Procedure of the European Union 
of 15 January 2013 with recommendations to the Commission on a Law of Administrative Procedure 
of the European Union (2012/2024(INL)). 
See further P. Craig, 'A General Law on Administrative Procedure, Legislative Competence and Judicial 
Competence' (2013) European Public Law, 503. 
For more detail, see the chapter by Van Ommeren. 
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spontaneous convergence of national administrative law and thus strengthen the process 
of integration.49 
5.3. Allocation by Member States 
EV law may, either by way of specific rules or by general principles, directly influence the 
allocation of limited rights by Member States' authorities, irrespective of whether these 
limited rights have a national or a European origin. With regard to limited rights with a 
national origin, like gambling licences, Member States will 'only' have to respect basic 
EU principles while designing their authorisation scheme and taking allocation decisions. 
1b.e key issue is how these basic EU principles should be translated into more specific 
allocation rules. This issue will be considered separately below for public procurement 
law, internal market law and competition law (including State aid), although these areas 
overlap each other in practice. 
5.3.1. Public Procurement Law 
Both chronologically and analytically, public procurement law might be a very useful 
starting point to explore the possibilities for a generalised legal theory on the allocation 
of limited rights. While starting in the 1970s with some (general) requirements on the 
award of public contracts, 50 the 1990s showed not only a modernised and detailed update 
of the old directives, 51 but also an extension of these rules to public contracts for the 
provision of services. 52 The adoption in 2004 of one general directive on the award of 
public contracts seemed to complete this process of generalisation, 53 but the recent 
adoption of a new directive on the award of public contracts 54 and a separate Concessions 
Directive55 show that the process of generalisation and fine-tuning is an ongoing process. 
49 
so 
51 
52 
53 
European Parliament resolution concerning a Law of Administrative Procedure of the European Union 
of IS January 2013 with recommendations to the Commission on a Law of Administrative Procedure 
of the European Union (2012/2024(INL)). 
Council Directive 71/305/EEC of 26 July 1971 concerning the co-ordination of procedures for the 
award of public works contracts (1971] OJ L 185/5, and Council Directive 77/62/EEC of 21 December 
1976 coordinating procedures for the award of public supply contracts (1977) OJ L 13/1. 
Council Directive 93/36/EEC of 14 June 1993 coordinating procedures for the award of public supply 
contracts (1993] OJ L 199/54, and Council Directive 93/37/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning the 
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts (1993] OJ L 199/54. 
Council Directive 92/50/EEC of 18 June 1992 relating to the coordination of procedures for the award 
of public service contracts [1992] OJ L 209/1. 
Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the 
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public 
servlc~ ~ontracts (2004] OJ L 134/114. A special directive has been adopted for procurement procedures 
of entitles operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors: Directive No 2004/17/ 
EC (2004] OJ L 134/1. 
Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of26 February 2014 on public 
pr.ocurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (2014] OJ L 94/65. 
Duect!ve 2014/23/EU f h E . · . f o t e uropean Parliament and of the Council of26 February2014 on the award 
o concession contracts (2014] OJ L 94/1. 
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Despite the appeal to extrapolate the extensive set of public procurement rules to 
other areas of limited rights, Jansen points out in his contribution that allocation rules 
cannot be fully understood without their particular context. In the case of public 
procurement law, this particular context is determined by public contracts. These public 
contracts consist of 'payment rights' that are awarded to market parties as consideration 
for the supply of goods or services. In this regard, it is necessary to keep in mind that the 
specific two-fold objective of the EU rules in the field of public procurement has always 
been to ensure the free movement of services and the opening up to undistorted 
competition in the Member States. 56 Consequently, only in as far as other areas of limited 
rights have these objectives in common, the rules on public procurement might be a 
useful starting point to develop a more general and consistent theory on the allocation of 
limited rights. 
To illustrate this tendency of extrapolation and its restrictions, 57 the Court's case-
law on the obligation of transparency is illuminating. Within the public procurement 
directives, rather detailed rules on transparency and advertising have always played a 
prominent role in order to guarantee potential tenderers equal opportunities to win 
the tender. However, the CJEU has held that a similar obligation of transparency 
applies - as a corollary of the fundamental freedoms in general (Articles 49 and 56 
TFEU) and the principle of equal treatment in particular - outside the scope of public 
contracts as well, first to service concessions (2000)58 and recently to limited 
authorisations (2011). According to the CJEU, this obligation of transparency is a 
'mandatory prior condition' of the right of a Member State to award to an operator the 
exclusive right to carry on an economic activity, irrespective of the method of selecting 
that operator, since the effects of an exclusive licence on undertakings established in 
other Member States and potentially interested in that activity are the same as those of 
a service concession contract. 59 However, although this obligation of transparency 
excludes the absence of any call for competition, 60 it does not require an invitation to 
tender as prescribed by the public procurement directives. Instead, it is sufficient in 
case oflimited authorisation schemes that the criteria of these schemes are sufficiently 
advertised.61 
With regard to legal protection, public procurement law plays a similar catalysing 
role. The remedies directive in public procurement law seeks to combine the need for 
effective and rapid remedies in procurement procedures with general EU principles of 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
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Into more detail on the relationship between public contracts, concessions and limited authorisations, 
See C.J. Wolswinkel, 'From public contracts to limited authorisations and vice versa. Exploring general 
award requirements from the EU Court's corollary approach' (2015) 24 (5) Public Procurement Law 
Review, 137. 
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Case C-203/08, Sporting Exchange [2009] ECR 1-4695, para. 47, and Case C-64/08, Engelmann [2010] 
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Case C-458/03, Parking Brixen [2005] ECR I-8585, para. 50. 
Case C-203/08, Sporting Exchange [2009] ECR I-4695, paras. 51-55. 
Paul Adriaanse, Frank van Ommeren, Willemien den Ouden Johan Wolswinkel 
effective legal protection, effectiveness and equivalence. 62 Solutions found in this area of 
law may inspire more general reflections on legal protection issues concerning the 
allocation oflimited rights. 
5.3.2. Internal Market Law 
lhe fundamental freedoms of movement, especially the freedom to provide services 
(Article 56 TFEU) and the freedom of establishment (Article 49 TFEU) have proven to 
be very important in the regulation of the allocation of limited rights, in particular 
limited authorisations. This holds first of all for sector-specific directives that have been 
adopted in order to facilitate the freedoms of service provision or establishment in a 
particular area. These directives identify limited authorisation schemes as a separate 
category of authorisation schemes with an additional set of requirements.63 However, 
limited authorisation schemes have also been evaluated under the general provisions of 
the TFEU. However, as the chapter by Hatzopoulos unveils, what matters for the CJEU is 
the impact on the freedom of movement. Consequently, the dividing line between non-
limited and limited authorisations has not always been drawn very clearly by the CJEU, 
just like the line between public contracts, concessions and (limited) authorisations. 
Moreover, this chapter gives rise to the conjecture that important EU 'principles' like the 
principle of mutual recognition, cannot be applied one-on-one in the case of limited 
authorisation schemes, as mutual recognition of authorisations might thwart a limited 
authorisation scheme in a Member State. 
Whereas we saw already in Section 4 that the EU legislature does not seem to 
contribute much to the development of detailed rules on the allocation of limited rights, 
the role of the CJEU seems to be expanding. First of all, case law has made clear that a 
ceiling should be considered a restriction to the freedom of movement additional to the 
restriction following from a prior authorisation scheme as such: an undertaking 
satisfying all other granting criteria may be refused an authorisation with single reference 
to this limitation. 64 In order to be justified, this limitation should comply with the 
general requirements of non-discrimination, justification by an overriding reason of 
public interest, suitability and necessity. Although the exact relevance of these 
requirements in practice is far from clear when it comes to a limitation of the number of 
available authorisations, Wolswinkel shows that the CJEU seems to be increasingly 
prepared to translate the general requirements of suitability and necessity into more 
specific allocation rules to evaluate the allocation of limited rights. However, it would go 
too far to derive a general hierarchy between allocation procedures from the fundamental 
63 
Directi.ve 2_007/66/EC of the European Parl iament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 amending 
Counc•l Dtrectives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with regard to improving the effectiveness of review 
procedures concerni ng the award of public contracts [2007) 0) L 335/31. ~~e for e~a~ple Directive 94/22/EEC of the European Parliament and of the Council of30 May 1994 on 
f~ codndtttons for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production 
0 
• Y rocarbons [1994] OJ L 164/3. 
)oiDed Cases C-570/07 d 
an C-571/07, Blanco Perez and Chao G6mez [2009] ECR I-4629, paras. 54- 6 1. 
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freedoms, as such a hierarchy would be liable to restrict the fundamental freedoms even 
more. 
The Services Directive, which applies to almost all services, gives no reason to assume 
such a general hierarchy either. Nonetheless, it is worth emphasising that this directive 
contains some general provisions on limited authorisation schemes, in particular with 
regard to the need for a transparent and impartial selection procedure and to the duration 
of limited authorisations. With regard to duration, the general rule is that limited 
authorisations - in contrast with non-limited authorisations - should be granted for a 
limited period of time.65 Although several other allocation issues remain unanswered in 
the Services Directive, e.g. the tradability of limited authorisations, this directive 
endorses at least the need for and the possibilities of a generalised theory of the allocation 
of limited rights. 
Both the CJEU in its case-law under the fundamental freedoms and the EU legislature in 
the Services Directive seem to worry most about discrimination of new entrants. This is 
not surprising, as new entrants will usually be undertakings from other Member States, 
as a result of which discrimination of new entrants amounts to discrimination on 
grounds of nationality, which affects the cornerstone of the fundamental freedoms. 
Interestingly, the chapter by Den Ouden and Tjepkema shows that the ECHR seems to 
give more weight to the interests of current holders of limited rights, usually incumbent 
parties vis-a-vis the interests of new entrants, at least if (limited) authorisations are 
withdrawn and subsequently re-allocated. Thus, the legal regime of Article l First 
Protocol on protection of property might give rise to the development of additional rules 
on the allocation of limited rights, supplementary to, or even conflicting with, the 
allocation rules deriving from the EU fundamental freedoms of movement. 
5.3.3. Competition Law (Including State Aid Law) 
Apart from internal market law and the fundamental freedoms of movement, competition 
law may be relevant for the allocation oflimited rights. First, according to Article 106(1) 
TFEU, Member States shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to 
the rules contained in the Treaties - in particular the prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of nationality66 and the rules on competition67 - in the case of undertakings to 
which Member States grant special or exclusive rights. Since limited rights (might) 
classify as special or exclusive rights, this Treaty provision seems to cover limited rights 
in particular. Although the granting oflimited rights does not as such result in abuse, for 
example, by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within (a substantial part 
of) the internal market,68 it should be realised that such an abuse might occur more 
65 
66 
67 
68 
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easily in the case of limited rights. In order to avoid such an abuse, the CJEU has 
emphasised the need for 'equality of opportunity', which may have important 
consequences for a consistent design of allocation procedures over time, apart from the 
need for transparent allocation procedures at a specific moment. 
1he need for transparency has also emerged in the area of State aid law.69 Although the 
well-known criteria applying to the classification of measures as State aid, do not refer to 
allocation issues explicitly, this area cannot be neglected when developing a general legal 
theory on the allocation of limited rights. For rights which are fully or partly regulated 
by EU law, the possible influence of the EU State aid rules may follow explicitly from the 
applicable EU legal framework, as is for example the case for emission rights70 and 
European subsidies.71 But also by lack of such explicit reference in EU legislation, or 
when limited rights are not regulated by EU legislation, the State aid rules will have to be 
taken into account when allocating these rights. According to consistent case law of the 
CJEU, the concept of State aid 'embraces not only positive benefits, such as subsidies, but 
also measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included 
in the budget of an undertaking and which, therefore, without being subsidies in the 
strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect'.72 1hus, this 
broad interpretation of State aid may cause the allocation of limited rights to come 
within the realm of State aid law. In fact, a variety of allocation scenarios can come 
within the scope of State aid, e.g. free allocation of rights instead of selling or auctioning 
them,73 over-allocations of tradable rights, allocations based on discretionary powers 
without objective criteria or based on preferential terms for certain undertakings or 
sectors74 and allocations of comparable limited authorisations with different fees.75 
Adriaanse shows, however, that it is still hard to draw some general conclusions from the 
CJEU's case-by-case approach. The 2014 draft Commission Communication on the 
definition of State aid law may provide more guidance in this respect, emphasising the 
need for transparent and competitive allocation procedures in order to prevent State aid. 
In sum, it can be concluded that State aid law is still waiting for a hallmark judgment on 
the allocation of limited rights. 
At the same time, Adriaanse shows that State aid law sheds some interesting light on 
issues oflegal protection. If a measure qualifies as State aid, a whole proactive set of rules, 
69 
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procedures and powers enters into force?6 The following procedure, during which the 
Member State concerned is not allowed to put ils proposed measures into effect, may take 
at least a few months. Especially in allocation procedures on limited rights, in which 
different parties with parallel or opposite interests often have an interest in an early 
outcome, this delayed decision-making may cause problems. However, breaching the 
procedural State aid rules could cause even bigger problems, since unlawfully granted 
State aid plus interest may have to be recovered from the beneficiaries, and damages 
might have to be paid. The rigorous case law of the CJEU in this respect limits the 
opportunities for recipients of unlawful State aid to oppose recovery?7 Simultaneously, 
the C]EU's case law offers opportunities for competitors of State aid recipients to rely on 
directly effective EU law provisions before national courts in order to appeal against 
unlawful State aid.78 In the search for general rules and principles underlying the 
possibilities for legal protection when allocating limited rights, this State aid case law has 
to be taken into account. 
6. Bottom-Up Approach: Comparative Law Perspectives 
The top-down approach adopted in the previous section shows, on the one hand, that 
several legal concepts of EU law are relevant for (a consistent approach to) the allocation 
of limited rights, but, on the other hand, that the limitations resulting from EU law 
should not be overstated. In other words, even if spillover effects of more detailed 
provisions in EU law are certainly not to be excluded, Member States are not entirely 
bound by EU law in the ways they limit the number of rights available and how they 
allocate these limited rights. Consequently, Member States still enjoy an (extensive) 
amount of discretion as to the design of allocation procedures for limited rights. 
These conclusions mark the need for a comparative view in addition to the top-down 
approach followed in the previous section. This bottom-up approach completes our 
search for relevant rules and principles for a general legal theory on the allocation of 
limited rights: as far as general rules in EU law on the allocation of limited rights are 
lacking, 'best performances' derived from practices in different Member States or specific 
areas of law, may be helpful in optimising the authorities' discretion with regard to the 
allocation of a certain limited right. 
In order to facilitate the identification of best practices under a comparative 
bottom-up approach, we distinguish two levels of comparison. First, it is useful to 
distinguish between several limited rights with regard to their' degree ofEuropeanisation', 
i.e. the extent to which the allocation of these rights is subject to (specific) EU law. At one 
end of this sliding scale, there are limited rights which are entirely governed by EU law 
and therefore leave no room for discretion to Member States. An example of this is the 
granting of subsidies in the case of' direct management' (Section 5.2). At the other end of 
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this scale, there are limited rights that .lack any connection with relevant EU rules, e.g. 
limited rights with regard to rules on business opening hours79 or national authorisations 
or subsidies without any cross-border impact.80 In the absence of any boundaries 
imposed by EU law, the allocation of such limited rights is to be guided by national legal 
rules and principles, like the principle oflegal certainty or the principle of due care.81 
In addition to this first level of comparison between sector-specific areas of law, the 
second level of comparison is that of the Member States: how do they use their discretion 
within a sector-specific area of law? Given the existence of more or less discretion as to 
the design of allocation procedures, a comparison between countries may generate 
interesting and fruitful insights for an optimal design of allocation procedures. 
Within this book, as to the first dimension of comparison, three kinds of limited rights 
have been selected on the basis of their degree of Europeanisation: emission allowances, 
authorisations for the use offrequency space and gambling licences. With regard to these 
three areas of law, reports on allocation practices in seven Member States have been 
collected: France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania and Spain.82 This 
selection does not only provide a rich variety of allocation practices, but also allows 
taking into account the different legal traditions that might be relevant from a conceptual 
point of view. 
As regards the allocation of emission allowances, the overview chapter by R~mne 
shows clearly the intensity ofEU legislation that has governed the EU Emissions Trading 
System from its very start. It is worth pointing out that this regulatory framework has 
been adopted to pursue environmental objectives rather than to ensure the functioning 
of the internal market. Nonetheless, there are still new tendencies towards a more 
centralised allocation of allowances. One example is the uniform prescription of the 
auction as the allocation procedure to be applied. Moreover, the relevant EU legislation 
provides for one uniform auction platform which facilitates the allocation of emission 
allowances at an EU-wide level. 
A similar development towards a more centralised regulatory framework for the 
allocation of limited rights seems to be taking place in the area of radio spectrum 
management. Currently, this area is governed by a set of directives, known as the 'new 
common regulatory framework', which still leaves room for Member States to make 
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their own choices in the allocation of individual rights of use for radio frequencies. 
However, Oberst sketches several recent developments in the EU regulation of spectrum 
management that might foster further harmonisation. At the same time, this area oflaw 
still shows diverging choices between Member States, for example on the treatment of 
new entrants versus incumbents. After all, it seems that - as a paradox - more detailed 
regulation at EU level does not necessarily imply a restriction of the regulatory choices of 
the Member States. 
In the absence of any secondary legislation, the area of gambling law, by contrast, is 
governed by primary EU law only, in particular the freedom to provide services and the 
freedom of establishment. Given this rather general legal framework, it should not be 
surprising that Member States are allowed to make diverging choices with regard to the 
limitation and allocation of gambling authorisations, e.g. by maintaining legal 
monopolies or by introducing limited authorisation schemes with minimal geographic 
distances between establishments. Nonetheless, Member States' discretion is not 
unlimited. In this respect, Van den Bogaert and Cuyvers show that the CJEU is prepared 
to tighten up when applying the general requirements of suitability and necessity: 
gambling activities that are subject to a limited authorisation scheme, should be restricted 
in a consistent and coherent manner in order to avoid hypocrisy in the allocation policy. 
The first contours resulting from the description of these three areas of law are a useful 
starting point to develop a more complete picture of the allocation of limited rights in 
different areas ofEU law. In particular, by considering these three kinds oflimited rights 
as specific points on a sliding scale, other limited rights83 could be compared with these 
examples as well. By doing so, it is not only possible to identify best practices in other 
areas of law, but also to develop general principles that reappear in any allocation of 
limited rights, irrespective of the sector-specific legislation and irrespective of the 
Member States. These principles may contribute to the development of a general legal 
theory on the allocation of limited public rights in addition to the elements resulting 
from the top-down approach. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
This introductory chapter to the book Scarcity and the State seeks to demonstrate the 
need for a consistent and general legal theory on the allocation of limited rights by 
administrative authorities. In this regard, we have started from two fundamental 
assumptions. First, EU law plays an important role in the allocation of limited public 
rights, both at EU level and at national level. Secondly, all EU Member States deal with 
the allocation of limited public rights in various policy fields . In order to identify 
allocation rules and principles facilitating a general legal theory of the allocation of 
limited rights in the EU and its Member States, we have elaborated on these two 
83 Examples include the granting of authorisations for exploring and producing hydrocarbons, the award 
of rights of use with regard to water as a scarce resource and the grant of concessions for public 
transport. 
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assumptions by way of a threefold approach: a conceptual perspective, a top-down (EU 
law) perspective and a (comparative) bottom-up perspective. 
From this introductory analysis we can conclude that although several legal concepts of 
EU law appear to be relevant for (a consistent and general theory of) the allocation of 
limited rights, and tendencies of harmonisation can be observed in particular fields of 
law, the guidance provided by EU law should not be overstated. Influences from EU law 
occur in different ways, but are fragmented rather than structured. In some areas oflaw, 
European institutions or national authorities should comply with specific allocation 
rules explicitly provided for, whereas in other areas influence comes along the lines of the 
basic TFEU provisions on the internal market and competition. In other words, Member 
States are not entirely bound by EU law in the ways in which they limit the number of 
rights available and how they allocate these limited rights. Having said that, spillover 
effects from more detailed provisions are certainly not to be excluded. Moreover, this 
introductory analysis makes clear that a consistent analysis of the allocation of limited 
rights does not necessarily entail the application of the same uniform set of rules to all 
allocation issues. Instead of generalising without any restraint specific allocation rules 
applicable in certain policy fields or certain Member States, the particularities of each 
allocation context may limit the possibilities for expansion. 
In more general terms, we submit that the scarcity perspective provided for by the 
allocation of limited rights offers new and surprising insights; not only into allocation 
topics, but also into other traditional topics of administrative law, for example legal 
protection or mutual recognition. While transparency is an essential focal point within 
this scarcity perspective, this chapter demonstrates that allocation concerns more than 
just transparency. 
It is clear that the lens provided by this scarcity perspective, needs to be polished even 
further. To that end, the comparative exercises on the allocation of limited rights, both 
between areas oflaw and between Member States (as well as between Member States and 
the EU), are worth continuing within legal academia. What is more, however, both the 
legislature and the judiciary can play an important role in developing a general legal 
theory on the allocation of limited rights that takes into account the peculiar 
characteristics of these rights. 
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